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Abstract
The investment of the ECB reserves in US dollars and yen, delegated to a network of portfolio 
managers in the Eurosystem’s national central banks, involves a periodic assessment of performance 
against a common benchmark, controlled by the ECB and subject to revision on a monthly basis. 
Monetary reward for the best performers is almost entirely absent, and compensation comes mainly as 
reputational credit following the transmission of the annual report to the Governing Council. 
Employing a new data set on individual portfolio variables during 2002-2009, we study this peculiar 
tournament and show the existence of risk-shifting behaviour by reserve managers related to their 
year-to-date ranking: interim losers increase relative risk in the second half of the year, in the same 
way as mutual fund managers. In the dollar case, risk-shifting is asymmetric: the adjustment to 
ranking is generally reduced or entirely offset if reserve managers have achieved a positive interim 
performance against the benchmark. Yen reserve managers that rank low show a tendency to increase 
effort, as proxied by portfolio turnover. We also find that reserve managers who ranked low in the 
previous year tend to reduce risk significantly. Our evidence is consistent with a reserve managers’ 
anecdote, according to which they obtain a concave reputational reward within their national central 
banks, which induces risk aversion and explains the observed low usage of the risk budget. Since 
reserve managers should have a comparative advantage over the tactical benchmark within a monthly 
horizon, possible enhancements to the design of the tournament are discussed. These might involve an 
increased reward for effort and performance by means of a convex scoring system linked to monthly, 
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Non-technical summary 
This paper aims to make an original contribution on three issues. First, it performs an empirical study 
on the management of the ECB’s foreign reserves, a setting which has never been explored before. 
Second, while the existing studies on tournaments in the mutual fund industry have extensively 
investigated the management of equity funds, we present the first analysis of a tournament involving 
actively managed bond portfolios. Third, we estimate the effect of ranking on portfolio managers’ 
effort, something that has not been attempted previously. 
The purpose of the ECB’s foreign reserves is to finance possible interventions in the foreign exchange 
market. The stock of these assets is the result of the initial transfer from participating National Central 
Banks (NCBs) and of the investment operations, as well as of interventions. At the end of 2010 the 
ECB’s official foreign reserve assets were worth around €57 billion, of which €17 billion gold, €0.4 
billion SDRs and the remainder in US dollar and Japanese yen assets. The investment of the reserves 
is based on a central risk management function and a decentralised approach for investment 
operations. The portfolio managers, located at different NCBs, are assigned a benchmark portfolio for 
each currency, mainly invested in high-grade bills and bonds. Until the end of 2005 the investment 
mandate was given uniformly to all NCBs, implying that each used to run two subportfolios, one in 
dollars and one in yen. With a view to improving efficiency, since January 2006 an approach 
combining expression of interest with currency specialization has replaced the uniform model, 
resulting in a smaller number of actual portfolios. On a monthly basis the performance of the 
individual portfolios is assessed. Once a year a general report is produced and submitted to the 
Governing Council of the ECB; the report includes the annual performance ranking of the NCB 
portfolio managers for each currency. 
The investment framework and the risk control rules for the ECB’s foreign reserves have proven in the 
field to be financially sound. For both currencies, in the years 1999-2010 the actual portfolios have 
outperformed the respective benchmarks on average; the move to expression of interest cum currency 
specialization in 2006 has led to an overall improvement in portfolio performance. The framework, 
inspired by the overarching principles of liquidity and security of the ECB’s foreign reserves, provides 
for them to be managed prudently in a way that maximises their value.  
Our interest for risk choices is stimulated by the observation that the actual portfolios make a limited 
use of the market risk budget assigned by the ECB. The question that we address is as follows: does 
the current ranking system affect portfolio managers’ risk-taking and effort during the year? We 
therefore perform a study on monthly performance, risk and turnover for each of the twelve managing 
NCBs (or pools of NCBs) that were active throughout the years 2002-2009. A distinctive feature 
compared with the private sector is that monetary reward for the best performers is almost absent, and 
compensation comes mainly as reputational credit. 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1377
September 2011
We find evidence of significant risk-shifting in response to year-to-date ranking. Dollar managers 
increase all risk variables if their portfolio is performing below the benchmark, while above-
benchmark performers do not adjust on the basis of their interim ranking. We also detect a feedback 
from past year ranking for dollar managers who are below the benchmark: in the second semester they 
significantly reduce risk and effort. In the yen case, year-to-date ranking leads reserve managers to 
shift mainly spread risk and independently of their relative return. The feedback from past year 
ranking is found for spread risk and effort. Currency specialization has led low ranking yen managers 
to increase effort. We interpret the empirical finding that past year losers systematically reduce risk in 
light of a concern for capital preservation, which is higher among NCB foreign reserve managers than 
in other portfolio tournaments. This feature, which explains the low usage of the risk budget, may 
cause a loss of performance. 
Some results of agency theory may shed light on the efficient design of the tournament. We explore 
possible alternatives to the current ranking system and to the “award” of reputation, which might 
better exploit the portfolio managers’ comparative advantages and elicit their effort. These alternatives 
would involve an increased reward for effort and performance by means of a convex scoring system 
linked to monthly, rather than annual, performance. More innovative changes, which would involve 
some review of the general rules, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 7
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This paper aims to make an original contribution on three issues. First, it performs an empirical study 
on the relationship between ranking, risk-taking and effort in the management of the ECB’s foreign 
reserves, a setting which has never been explored before. Second, our analysis is related to the existing 
studies on tournaments and risk-shifting in the mutual fund industry. While this literature has 
extensively investigated the management of equity funds, we present the first analysis to our 
knowledge of a tournament involving actively managed bond portfolios. This feature may fill a gap, 
since it is not obvious that the risk-shifting hypothesis may extend to an environment where overall 
risk is much lower compared with equity portfolios. Third, we examine the effect of ranking on 
portfolio managers’ effort, something that has not been attempted in previous empirical research. 
The purpose of the ECB’s foreign reserves is to finance possible interventions in the foreign exchange 
market. Based on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, the stock of these assets is the 
result of the initial transfer from participating National Central Banks (NCBs) and of the investment 
operations, as well as of interventions (Scheller, 2006). At the end of 2010 the ECB’s official foreign 
reserve assets were worth around €57 billion, of which around €17 billion gold, €0.4 billion SDRs and 
the remainder in US dollar and Japanese yen assets. The shares of dollar and yen assets were around 
76 and 24 per cent respectively.  
The investment of the ECB’s foreign reserves is based on a central risk management function and a 
decentralised approach for investment operations, which involve those NCBs that wish to take part in 
these activities on behalf of the ECB. This organisation hinges on two portfolio management mandates 
(see ECB, 2006). The first envisages the outperformance of long-term strategic benchmarks, one in 
each currency portfolio, in compliance with specific investment guidelines. Positions are reviewed and 
possibly changed once a month, making up two tactical benchmarks (one in each currency). This 
mandate has been given to the ECB’s Investment Committee. The second mandate envisages the 
outperformance of the tactical benchmarks by the actual portfolios in compliance with specific 
investment guidelines. Until the end of 2005 this mandate was given uniformly to all NCBs, implying 
that each used to run two subportfolios, one in dollars and one in yen. With a view to improving 
efficiency, since January 2006 an approach combining expression of interest with currency 
specialization has replaced the uniform model, resulting in a smaller number of actual portfolios. On a 
monthly basis the performance of the individual portfolios is assessed, also by means of year-to-date 
performance rankings of managers. Once a year a general report is produced and submitted to the 
Governing Council of the ECB; the report includes the annual performance ranking of the NCB 
portfolio managers for each currency. The allocation of mandates may be reviewed periodically if the 
need arises. 
                                                           
1 The authors are grateful to Luca Anderlini, Daniele Terlizzese, Gioia Cellai, Roberto Schiavi, Anna Pavlova, 
Livio Stracca, to an anonymous referee and to seminar participants at the ECB and the Banca d’Italia for their 
useful suggestions. 8
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The three-layer framework and the risk control rules for the management of the ECB’s foreign 
reserves have proven in the field to be financially sound, as documented by the internal reports. These 
show in particular that for both currencies, in the years 1999-2010, the actual portfolios have 
outperformed the respective tactical benchmarks on average; the tactical benchmarks in turn have 
outperformed the strategic benchmarks; and the move to expression of interest cum currency 
specialization in 2006 has led to an overall improvement in portfolio performance. The framework, 
inspired by the overarching principles of liquidity and security of the ECB’s foreign reserves, provides 
for them to be managed prudently in a way that maximises their value. 
In the case of the ECB’s foreign reserves, the interest for risk choices is stimulated by the observation 
that the actual portfolios make a limited use of the market risk budget. For instance, in 2010 the 
average utilisation rate of the allowed budget for the portfolios was equal to 42 per cent and 17 per 
cent, respectively for the dollar and the yen. Utilisation was generally lower in previous years. The 
question that we address is as follows: does the current ranking system affect portfolio managers’ risk-
taking and effort during the year? For this purpose we employ panel regressions on a detailed dataset 
of monthly performance, risk and turnover for each of the twelve managing NCBs (or pools of NCBs) 
that were active throughout the years 2002-2009, i.e. in the last four years of the uniform approach 
(2002-2005) and in the first four years of currency specialization (2006-2009).  
After finding evidence of ranking-related risk-shifting by several portfolio managers, we examine the 
implications of managers’ choices for the ultimate goal of the actual portfolios. We therefore consider 
the peculiar nature of the reserve management tournament in light of the general principles of the 
investment framework. Key to our setting is the fact that upfront monetary incentives are almost 
absent and competition among portfolio managers is based on reputational credit. No theoretical 
model of delegated portfolio management can capture the elusive nature of non-monetary incentives in 
a multiple-agent setting, where a number of factors may be at play, like national preferences, traders’ 
heterogeneity, behavioural aspects, etc.
2  However some results of agency theory may shed light on 
the efficient design of the tournament. In particular, noting that the annual performance rank generates 
reputation within each NCB and among peers, we explore possible alternatives to the current ranking 
system and to the “award” of reputation, which would be relatively easy to implement on policy 
grounds as well as from an operational viewpoint. More innovative changes, which would involve 
some review of the general rules, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                           
2 In general terms, the complex interplay between feedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments generates 
several incentive effects, which are extensively studied in organizational behaviour theory. See for example 
Ederer (2010). 9
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A story from the sports world may vividly illustrate the role of scoring and ranking in contestants’ 
decision making, a subject that has been widely examined in the literature (e.g. Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990). Let’s assume that our rational stakeholder is a fan of Formula 1 racing. They love 
tight competitions and the drivers’ search for performance during each race. The scoring system 
assigns 25 points to the race winner, 18 to the second driver, 15 points to the third one, and so on 
down to 1 point for the tenth position, whereas those who classify below tenth get nil. The final score 
for the drivers’ title as well as the constructors’ title is the sum of the points earned during the season. 
One day the race organizer, in the attempt to raise the interest of the public for Formula 1, proposes a 
change in the ranking system. Under the new scheme each driver would earn a number of points equal 
to his own race time. At the end of the season the times/points would be summed up and the driver, or 
the team, with the lowest overall times/points would win the title. Which scoring system would the 
rational Formula 1 fan prefer? The answer seems obvious, and we leave it to the reader. We observe 
that in analytical terms the Formula 1 scoring function is highly convex in the arrival order, whereas 
the new hypothetical function would be linear in the race times.
3  The scoring/ranking system, together 
with the level of compensation, can clearly influence the agents’ strategies. 
Our analysis is directly related to the empirical studies of fund managers’ tournaments. Past 
performance is the main determinant of fund selection, through a convex flow-performance 
relationship (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998); hence fund managers actively 
pursue the growth of the assets under management, which brings about a rise in the fees. This 
observation underpins the broad version of the tournament (or risk-shifting) hypothesis, according to 
which fund managers adjust portfolio composition depending on year-to-date performance. The 
empirical evidence supports this hypothesis in its narrow-sense version, according to which interim 
winners lock-in their outperformance and reduce risk, while interim losers increase volatility in the 
attempt to catch up (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996). 
Performance in the previous years also displays a significant effect on risk positions: the more 
consistently portfolio managers have been losers (winners) in the past the more (less) likely it is that 
they will have an above average risk exposure (Brown et al., 1996). 
Subsequent empirical research has shown that risk-shifting may partly be a spurious consequence of 
survivorship bias (Qiu, 2003) and of returns correlation (Busse, 2001; Goriaev, Nijman and Werker, 
2005), and that risk-shifting in its narrow version is less pronounced for funds that make an active use 
of derivative instruments (Koski and Pontiff, 1999). Tournaments take place not only in a given fund 
segment, but also within families of funds that belong to the same controlling group but offer 
                                                           
3 The scoring system of Formula 1 has indeed been changed several times in recent years (see 
www.formula1.com). It should be clear that the example is made for general purposes and has no relationship of 
substance with the investment tournament for the ECB’s foreign reserves. The latter is by construction a highly 
prudent activity within the broader portfolio management business, whereby the maximum amount of risk that 
can be taken is capped very low. From a risk perspective the foreign reserve management tournament is at most 
like an athletic race, definitely not like a car race. 10
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alternative investment styles (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008). Tournament behaviour is also detected via 
risk measures based on portfolio holdings (Schwarz, 2009). Compared with compensation incentives, 
employment concerns may present offsetting effects on risk-taking, and the latter type of incentives 
may even dominate the former, as in the case of a bear market (Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele, 2009).  
On the theoretical side, a vast literature has modelled mutual fund tournaments and challenged the 
narrow-sense risk-shifting hypothesis, that losers gamble and winners index (Acker and Duck, 2006; 
Basak and Makarov, 2010; Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro, 2007; Chen and Pennacchi, 2009; Goriaev, 
Palomino and Prat, 2001; Taylor, 2003). The degree of risk tolerance affects the risk-ranking 
relationship and, under risk neutrality, may even cause winners to gamble (Basak and Makarov, 2010). 
Risk-shifting may also be influenced by general market conditions (as in Acker and Duck, 2006). Very 
pertinent to our analysis is the result of Goriaev et al. (2001), who study the interplay between relative 
return objectives and ranking concerns. They show that the introduction of a ranking component in the 
compensation scheme generates risk-taking incentives for an interim loser in the last period of the 
tournament. If the weight of ranking in the objective function is relatively large, then the risk-taking 
incentives of the interim loser increase with the distance to the interim winner. A common thread in 
this literature is that the relevant measure for decision making is risk relative to the benchmark, rather 
than portfolio volatility. The empirical tests using relative risk measures are more clearly in favour of 
the narrow tournament hypothesis (Acker and Duck, 2006; Basak et al., 2007; Chen and Pennacchi, 
2009; Goriaev et al., 2001). Ngo and Nguyen (2011) have recently developed a tournament model 
where competing fund managers make a joint choice on risk levels and effort, and show that when the 
latter is costly the interim winner exerts higher effort and chooses a lower risk than the interim loser. 
Based on the notion that the cost of effort is high in bear markets, the empirical test lends support to 
the risk level predictions but it does not extend to those on the amount of managers’ effort. 
We depart from previous empirical studies as regards the type of assets under management, the 
analysis of effort and the testing methodology. On the first aspect, we are not aware of any other 
studies of the tournament hypothesis in the case of actively managed bond portfolios. Our 
complementarity to the extant research seems relevant, mainly because our setting presents a much 
lower volatility compared with equity portfolios. We perform a clinical study on this issue, thanks also 
to the quality of our data.  
Second, until now the empirical study of mutual funds’ managerial effort (e.g. Cremers and Petajisto, 
2009; Xie, 2011) has tried to explain it in view of fund characteristics and of the time-varying flow-
performance relationship, which may cause changes in the marginal utility of effort. We try to 
measure the amount of managerial effort and seek to advance the analysis by linking it to the 
incentives created by ranking. For this purpose we use portfolio turnover as a proxy of effort.  11
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In terms of testing methodology, past empirical research has generally examined ex post risk variables 
sampled yearly using semi-parametric methods. For instance, Brown et al. (1996) employ a standard 
deviation ratio, given by the fund’s volatility after the interim performance assessment date divided by 
volatility up to that date. The studies which employ mutual fund holdings data to measure ex ante 
changes in risk positions (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Kempf et al., 2009; Schwarz, 2009) are a 
minority. We take a different approach and estimate panel regressions on the monthly response to 
ranking of ex ante risk positions relative to the benchmark, after controlling for a set of market 
variables.
4 Our risk variables are based on asset holdings and, being unaffected by subsequent market 
movements, they exactly pin down the intentional changes in risk positions. In particular, since the 
ECB’s foreign reserves are invested in fixed income instruments, we distinguish duration risk, spread 
risk and curve risk. On account of the closed nature of the tournament, whereby the number of 
contestants is fixed and the year-to-date performance ranking of each portfolio manager is known to 
all peers every month, we directly employ the year-to-date rank order as our key explanatory variable. 
We find that risk-shifting in response to interim ranking occurs even in the first half of the year, 
although it becomes much stronger in the second semester. Dollar managers shift all risk variables 
and, to a lesser extent, effort if their portfolio is performing below the benchmark, while above-
benchmark performers do not adjust on the basis of their ranking. We also detect a strong feedback 
from past year ranking for dollar managers who are below the benchmark: in the second semester they 
significantly reduce risk and effort. The inception of currency specialization as from 2006, involving a 
tighter tournament among a smaller group of reserve managers, has been accompanied by an increase 
of spread risk-shifting in relation to interim ranking, and by some lessening of the other types of 
adjustment. In the yen case, interim ranking leads reserve managers to shift mainly spread risk and 
independently of their relative return. The feedback from past year ranking is found for spread risk and 
effort. Currency specialization has led low ranking yen managers to increase effort. We interpret the 
empirical finding that past year losers systematically reduce risk in light of concavity in the reputation 
function, motivated by a concern for capital preservation, which seems higher among NCB foreign 
reserve managers than in other portfolio tournaments. As a result, in our environment the manager’s 
(reputational) payoff is kinked, and reminiscent of that of the seller of a put option with an exercise 
price equal to the value of the benchmark portfolio. This feature, which explains the low usage of the 
risk budget, may cause a loss of performance. 
Our results naturally lend themselves to some normative considerations. An agency implication of the 
risk-shifting evidence in the literature is that, by focusing attention on relative annual return, the 
mutual fund industry may effectively be changing managerial incentives from a long-term to a short-
term perspective (Brown et al., 1996; van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen, 2008). In our setting the 
analogous finding might lead to the opposite conclusion. The investment horizon which in principle 
                                                           
4 The use of multivariate panel regressions has a precedent in Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) and Kempf et al. (2009). 12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1377
September 2011
reaps the full benefits of the three-layer management framework is very short, and equal to one month 
(Cardon and Coche, 2004; Koivu, Monar and Nyholm, 2009). However in practice ECB foreign 
reserve managers adopt the one-year horizon, over which their performance is eventually assessed and 
reputation awarded by the Governing Council. Therefore in our case the risk-ranking relationship 
introduces an annual orientation which may conflict with the length of the efficient investment 
horizon.  
Considering the peculiar nature of the ECB’s foreign reserve management framework, where the rules 
are fully controlled by the owner of the funds, we examine some implications of agency theory (see 
Stracca, 2006 for a survey of delegated portfolio management models). General results of 
compensation theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) and the model of Dybvig, 
Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010), which derives optimum incentives when portfolio managers’ effort 
and private signals are not observable, suggest that a convex reputation function might induce a more 
efficient use of the risk budget. An intertwined issue is the discrepancy between the investment 
horizon of the portfolios and the assessment horizon. In this perspective, and leaving the annual 
assessment frequency unchanged, a tournament applying a convex scoring function over a sequence of 
twelve monthly performance games would seem superior to the set-up where a concave reputation 
function is applied to a single performance game lasting for twelve months. The rank order is a 
possible incentive-compatible instrument for the aggregation of scores in different rounds. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the management framework and the tournament. 
Section 3 defines the variables and shows summary statistics on the data. Section 4 presents the panel 
estimates on the effect of ranking on risk-taking and effort for the reserve managers. Section 5 
examines more closely individual choices. Section 6 tries to assess whether effort and risk can 
systematically influence managers’ performance. Section 7 presents the normative discussion. Section 
8 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2 Set-up 
2.1 General framework 
The purpose of the ECB’s foreign reserves is to finance possible ECB interventions in the foreign 
exchange market. Such interventions have occurred twice since the ECB was created, in September 
and November 2000. The foreign reserve portfolios may also be used to finance the ECB's part of 
concerted interventions in the foreign exchange market, such as for example the intervention of 18 
March 2011 following the tragic events in Japan. Hence, considering this particular period, foreign 
exchange market interventions can be qualified as rather rare events. However, the first two 
intervention episodes were large, of an order of magnitude of around €10 billion in total. The increase 
in foreign exchange market turnover and the possibility of alternative types of foreign exchange 13
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interventions imply that the amounts to be spent in possible future intervention operations may be 
larger, or smaller, than this particular amount, depending on circumstances and on the objectives of 
such interventions. 
ECB foreign reserves initially comprised transfers of foreign reserve assets to the ECB from the NCBs 
of the euro-area countries, in proportion to each NCB’s capital share in the ECB (Scheller, 2006, ch. 
3). When new countries join the euro area, their NCBs also transfer foreign reserve assets to the ECB, 
in the same proportion as the other NCBs. Over time, the ECB’s foreign reserves may increase or 
decrease as a reflection of portfolio returns and of purchases or sales of foreign currency by the ECB. 
In addition, the ECB may call upon the euro-area NCBs to transfer additional foreign reserve assets if 
needed. Within the Eurosystem, which comprises the ECB and the euro-area NCBs, total foreign 
reserves amounted to around €591 billion equivalent at the end of 2010, of which around €57 billion 
were held by the ECB and around €534 billion were held by the NCBs. The purposes of the NCBs’ 
foreign reserves include: international obligations (e.g. holdings of IMF special drawing rights); 
optimization of balance sheet structure; and preparedness to transfer additional foreign reserve assets 
to the ECB if needed. It should also be noted that a significant portion of the Eurosystem’s foreign 
reserves is made up of gold holdings, which accounted for €366 billion equivalent (or 62 per cent) at 
the end of 2010. When comparing Eurosystem and ECB foreign reserve holdings with those of other 
central banks, it is important to bear in mind that the responsibilities of these other central banks as 
regards foreign exchange policies may differ from those of the ECB. 
The ECB foreign reserves’ portfolio management objectives derive from the purpose of the ECB’s 
foreign reserves. Accordingly, the high-level objectives are defined as being “liquidity, safety, return”, 
with the three aspects being ranked in this order of priority. Hence, portfolio liquidity and risk 
exposures are strictly controlled. Within the range of acceptable liquidity and risk profiles, the 
objective of the portfolio management process is to maximize portfolio returns. An important aspect of 
the portfolio management process is that portfolio managers are given leeway to take portfolio 
positions, whereby the composition of the portfolios they manage deviates somewhat from the 
reference benchmark portfolio, with the aim of adding to returns over time; this is in line with various 
studies that point to the prospects for active management to add return to fixed income portfolios (e.g. 
Boyd and Mercer, 2010). It is felt that this approach has benefits beyond the additional returns it 
generates, including in particular in terms of the market intelligence it contributes to developing; the 
operational expertise it requires, which is useful not only for investment operations but also for policy 
operations; and the generation of ideas which can be incorporated in the composition of the reference 
benchmark portfolios over time
5.  
                                                           
5 As an example of the last point, portfolio managers have in the past put forward proposals for using new 
investment instruments in the ECB’s foreign reserve portfolio. These instruments were useful for portfolio 
managers in the active management context but in certain cases they also turned out to be useful in improving 14
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As an important corollary, clearly with the active management approach the portfolio managers must 
not receive any inside information about monetary and exchange rate policies of the ECB or other 
central banks or authorities. Indeed, if such information were available to the portfolio managers, they 
could use it in order to adjust portfolio positions, which would give them an unfair advantage over 
other market participants and might lead other market participants to try and infer signals about policy 
intentions from the activities of the portfolio managers. More information about the principles and 
practice of ECB portfolio management can be found in ECB (2006). 
The investment opportunities and risk limits can be summarised as follows (see also Manzanares and 
Schwartzlose, 2009). There is a positive list of eligible investment instruments, respectively for the 
dollar and the yen, including government securities, securities issued by selected supranational 
institutions and agencies, and BIS instruments. Cash management operations include bank deposits, 
repos and reverse repos, while some derivative contracts are also allowed, in the form of interest rate 
and bond futures, interest rate swaps and fully-hedged foreign exchange swaps. With the exception of 
government securities, each investment class is subject to maximum risk limits of two types: 
individual issuer limits, in absolute value, and sector limits, as a percentage of portfolio size. These 
limits are designed to contain credit risk and liquidity risk. Besides, market risk is controlled via a 
ceiling on the actual portfolios relative VaR (one-day horizon, 99 per cent confidence level) compared 
with the tactical benchmark and on the tactical benchmarks’ relative VaR vis-à-vis the strategic 
benchmarks. Almost all eligible securities types are included in the benchmarks. 
In practice, ECB foreign reserve management is organized in the following way. For each currency, a 
strategic benchmark is decided upon by the ECB’s Governing Council on the basis of a proposal put 
forward by the risk management function of the ECB (detailed information about this approach can be 
found in Koivu, Monar and Nyholm, 2009). The active management then proceeds in two steps. First, 
tactical positions are proposed by the ECB’s portfolio managers and implemented in the tactical 
benchmarks, subject to the above-mentioned risk limits. The tactical benchmark positions are usually 
reviewed, and possibly changed, only once per month. Second, positions are implemented by the 
NCBs’ reserve managers in their subportfolios, again subject to the risk limits.  
The risk exposure taken by portfolio managers vis-à-vis the tactical benchmark derives from the 
“signals” they collect in their daily market analysis. The risk of an actively managed bond portfolio 
can be broadly grouped in three categories. First, portfolio managers may try to outguess the changes 
in the level of the yield curve, leading to an adjustment of the actual portfolio duration relative to the 
benchmark duration (duration risk). For instance, if a portfolio manager forecasts a rise in yields 
(beyond what is already incorporated in the choice of the tactical benchmark), he will shorten the 
duration of the trading portfolio below that of the benchmark. Second, portfolio managers may form 
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an expectation on the level of the yield spread of credit (i.e. non-government) instruments compared 
with the treasury yield curve, which would cause an adjustment in the share of credit instruments 
relative to the benchmark (spread risk). Third, portfolio managers may entertain views on the 
evolution of specific segments of the yield curve which, other things being equal, would lead to an 
adjustment of the shares of individual time-buckets compared with the benchmark (curve risk). 
Until the end of 2005, each NCB was involved in managing both a US dollar portfolio and a yen 
portfolio. Since 2006, with a view to achieving efficiency gains, portions of the portfolios are allocated 
to each NCB or pool of NCBs that expresses interest in being involved in ECB foreign reserve 
management. At the end of 2010 there were nine portfolios for the US dollar and six portfolios for the 
yen. Among these, three portfolios were pools between pairs of NCBs carrying out this activity jointly. 
The NCBs comprising the analysis, singularly or in pools, are those of Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Spain, Finland, France, Greece-Cyprus, Ireland-Malta, Italy, Luxembourg-Slovenia, the Netherlands, 
and Portugal.
6 For confidentiality reasons, in the analysis that follows each desk of national dealers is 
indicated by a random code, ranging from M1 to M12. 
Considering the experience so far with ECB foreign reserve management, the efficiency of the 
strategic benchmark can be confirmed ex post by comparing its returns with the returns of simpler 
investment strategies presenting similar risk, like investing in bills or short-term bonds. For example, 
strategies consisting of rolling over investments in three-month or six-month Treasury bills or two-
year Treasury notes would have achieved average yearly returns of 2.75, 2.98  and 3.30 per cent 
respectively over the period from January 1999 to December 2010, while the ECB's US dollar 
strategic benchmark returns (calculated in the same manner) were 3.96 per cent over the same period. 
For the Japanese yen, the roll-over of investments in six-month or twelve-month Japanese government 
bills or two-year government bonds would have achieved average yearly returns of 0.19, 0.23 and 0.43 
per cent respectively, while the ECB's Japanese yen strategic benchmark returns were 0.40 per cent. 
The objective of outperforming the strategic benchmark can thus be considered as rather challenging. 
In terms of actual investment performance, Table 1 shows the returns achieved by the actual portfolios 
compared with the strategic benchmarks. These excess returns have been positive in eleven out of 
twelve years for the US dollar portfolio and nine out of twelve years for the yen portfolio. Of the 
average yearly excess return of 12 basis points on both portfolios combined, around three quarters 
reflected the investment decisions made at the level of the actual portfolios by NCBs. 
                                                           
6 The NCB of Slovakia, which became a portfolio manager for the ECB’s foreign reserves upon entry into the 
Eurosystem in January 2009, has not been included in the analysis owing to the limited historical sample. 16
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2.2 The tournament 
The stylized facts about the foreign reserve management tournament are as follows. The objective of 
the actual portfolios is to outperform the tactical benchmark. The assessment horizon for practical 
purposes is the calendar year, corresponding to the horizon for reporting to the Governing Council. 
Since the distribution of reserves reflects the NCBs’ capital share, the flow-performance relationship 
and the ensuing incentive structure of the private sector do not apply. The only type of global reward 
consists in good or bad reputation at the Governing Council level as a consequence of national 
performance and/or ranking in the previous year. The best portfolio managers obtain praise, from the 
ECB and from home; those who lag behind at the very least provoke a few raised eyebrows. 
Other types of reward in relation to performance are left to the discretion of individual NCBs. A 
survey among them has shown that in the sample period only two out of twelve envisaged a bonus 
related to the achievement of an annual ranking target set by the board, and the bonus was relatively 
small compared with base salary. In one case the NCB board set a performance target, although 
without attaching a bonus. Four NCBs, including the ones that paid a bonus, foresaw other forms of 
discretionary reward related to performance and/or ranking, mainly in terms of career development. 
Broadly speaking, in the medium term consistent achievement or losses reveal the portfolio manager’s 
skills and contribute to positive or negative career development, and thus indirectly to monetary 
reward. These employment incentives generally punish poor results less severely than in the private 
sector, in the sense that employment relationships at NCBs are quite often tenured. However, although 
with different modalities compared with the mutual fund market, peer pressure and competition are 
clearly at work in the management of the ECB’s reserves as well. In one aspect the ECB reserve 
management tournament is even more testing than the mutual fund tournament. Whereas in the latter 
case the number of competitors is usually in the hundreds, in the ECB’s case the number of players is 
below ten, implying very close scrutiny. 
In the majority of cases in which specific internal targets are not set, anecdotal evidence gathered from 
NCB portfolio managers indicates that they perceive a concave award of reputational credit over the 
final ranking: the negative reward for performing badly is larger in absolute terms than that for 
performing well, a feature which generates risk aversion over annual portfolio performance relative to 
the benchmark return. This shape for the reputation function is usually explained by portfolio 
managers with capital preservation concerns which, although already reflected in the choice of a 
prudential strategic benchmark with narrow deviation bands, permeates the culture of foreign reserves 
dealers and of their management. At the NCB level, in some cases the mandate to dealers can be 
described by the precept “first and foremost outperform the benchmark, then try to rank well”. 17
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We conjecture that the incentives offered to reserve managers during the year and their rational 
reaction to performance ranking may have similarities to those of private fund managers, and we set 
out to test this hypothesis. 
3 Data 
We seek to describe the managers’ choice variables along two dimensions: risk and effort. We 
therefore construct monthly time series of the type  c t i x , , , where the generic variable x is observed 
over manager i = 1,…, 12 and month t, ranging from January 2002 to December 2009. Each variable 
refers to a currency portfolio c = USD, JPY. In the years 2002-2005 all twelve NCBs, or pools thereof, 
used to run a dollar portfolio and a yen portfolio. During 2006-2009 our sample includes eight dollar 
portfolio managers and six yen portfolio managers (two NCBs manage both currencies). To capture 
the different dimensions of risk we construct three variables: 
Duration risk: this variable measures the duration exposure of the portfolio relative to the 
benchmark. It is defined as the absolute difference in years between the modified 
duration of the portfolio and that of the tactical benchmark, both observed on the last 
day of the month. 
Spread risk:  this measures the spread exposure of the portfolio relative to the benchmark and is 
defined as the absolute difference between the duration contribution of the spread 
instruments (deposits, BIS, supranationals, agencies) in the portfolio and that of the 
tactical benchmark, in years, at month end. 
Curve risk:  this variable measures the curve exposure of the portfolio relative to the benchmark, 
net of Duration risk. It is defined as the sum of the absolute differences between the 
duration contribution of each time bucket in the portfolio and the corresponding value 
for the benchmark, minus Duration risk, in years, at month end.  
Effort is proxied by the following variable: 
Turnover:  the ratio between monthly portfolio turnover and portfolio size, covering all 
transactions (cash management, securities, and derivatives). 
We note that our risk variables might also be viewed as proxies of (unobservable) effort, since they are 
computed as the sum of absolute differences in portfolio shares compared with the benchmark. For a 
fund manager, departing from the passive replication of the benchmark involves not only a conscious 
act of risk-taking but also hard work in terms of market analysis, price capture, security transactions, 
back office work, etc. This reasoning has recently induced Cremers and Petajisto (2009) to propose the 
“active share” measure of managerial efforts for equity mutual funds, which is basically the same 
approach used in the calculation of our variables Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk. In our 18
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case, since each of the three risk variables exactly matches one key dimension of risk in bond portfolio 
management, we prefer to think of our three variables as primarily risk measures. To the extent that 
the active share notion is more generally valid, there is clearly a positive association between risk and 
effort, and our subsequent inference on risk-taking may also be indicative of patterns in managerial 
effort, in addition to what we derive from the study of Turnover. 
Our key explanatory variables are: 
Rank:  the year-to-date return ranking among all portfolios in the same currency.
7 The raw 
ranking ranges between 1 (best interim performer) and 12 (worst interim performer) in 
the years before currency specialization, i.e. from 2002 to 2005, and from 1 to 8 (6) in 
the years 2006-2009 for the dollar (respectively the yen). For homogeneity, Rank is 
normalized to vary between 1 and 8 (6 for the yen) through the whole sample period. 
In the regressions we use the lagged value, i.e. Rank-1, which is strictly predetermined 
relative to the endogenous variables, and made known to all reserve managers in the 
first week of the month following the reference month. 
Last year rank: the final rank among reserve managers over the previous calendar year, normalized 
like Rank. This variable, which is constant for each manager during the year, measures 
the effect of the last completed tournament over current choices. 
Based on the previous discussion, we advance the hypothesis that lagged Rank will directly affect 
managers’ effort and risk-taking, along its three dimensions (duration, spread, and curve). For 
simplicity we conjecture a linear relationship between Rank and each dependent variable: those who 
rank in the lower half of the distribution (i.e. with larger values of Rank) from the beginning of the 
year to the previous month will increase risk and effort linearly. Conversely, those who rank in the top 
half of the distribution will reduce risk and effort. 
Last year rank might have a positive effect on risk and effort, as found in the mutual fund sector. 
However, if our anecdotal conjecture on the asymmetric reward function of portfolio managers is 
indeed at work, we could also see risk averse behaviour on the part of past losers, and Last year rank 
would display a negative effect on risk. 
Consistently with the literature, we hypothesize that risk-shifting will be more pronounced in the 
second half of the year, when the time to the end result becomes shorter. Besides, we try to ascertain 
whether risk-shifting in the second semester is affected by the portfolio return being above or below 
the benchmark return, since it could be argued that a low ranking manager might feel less pressure to 
gamble if his cumulated portfolio performance is positive. 
                                                           
7 We consistently use the term performance to mean the difference between portfolio return and benchmark 
return, which can have positive or negative values. By construction, our monthly ranking variables based on 19
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Our regression strategy is as follows: first, we use ranking variables that measure the undifferentiated 
effect, if any, over the year (lagged Rank and, respectively, Last year rank); second, we measure the 
differential effect of the same ranking variables in the second semester; third, limiting ourselves to the 
second semester, we measure the differential effect of the same variables when the portfolio manager 
has achieved a positive performance.  Then we construct the following variables: 
H2 rank:   the interaction between lagged Rank and an indicator variable equal to 1 from July to 
December and 0 otherwise. The regression coefficient measures the incremental 
effect, if any, of Rank in the second semester. 
H2 above bmk:  the interaction between H2 rank and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the cumulated 
performance in relation to the benchmark up until the previous month is positive. The 
regression coefficient measures the incremental effect, if any, of the portfolio return 
being above the benchmark return. In the second semester the total risk-shifting effect 
is given by the sum of the base effect of Rank plus the incremental effect of H2 rank 
(for all) plus the effect of H2 above bmk (for positive performers only). 
H2 last year:   is equal to Last year rank from July to December, and 0 otherwise. Analogously to H2
rank, this variable captures the presence of the incremental effect of Last year rank in 
the second semester. 
H2 last above: the interaction between H2 last year and the positive performance indicator variable. In 
the second semester total risk-shifting related to last year’s ranking is the sum of the 
base effect plus the incremental effect of H2 last year (for all) plus the effect of H2
last above (for positive performers in the current year). 
We also employ some control variables, aiming to characterize the state of the market in a 
parsimonious way. By construction they are manager-invariant: 
Term spread:   the slope of the yield curve. It is defined as the difference between 10-year and 2-year 
government bond yields, in percentage points, at month end. We will use the lagged 
value, Term spread-1. 
Ted spread:  the difference between the 3-month Libor rate and the 3-month T-bill rate, in 
percentage points, at month end. This variable measures the credit risk in the economy 
for the dollar case. We will use Ted spread-1. 
OIS spread:  the difference between the 3-month Libor rate and the 3-month overnight indexed 
swap rate, in percentage points, at month end. Like Ted spread, it measures credit risk 
in the case of the yen. We use OIS spread-1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
performance are identical to those which would have been obtained based on absolute return, since the 
benchmark return is the same across portfolios. 20
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Bond  volatility:    the annualized historical volatility of the price of 10-year government futures 
contracts, for current delivery, taken over the last sixty working days, in percentage 
points, at month end. This variable is a proxy of market volatility at the long end of 
the curve. Like Term spread, this variable is available for both currencies. We use its 
lagged value. 
The choice of the control variables reflects their role as key market indicators for portfolio decisions, 
the widespread use by market practitioners and their availability throughout the sample period. The 
source of these variables is Bloomberg. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics on the dependent variables in the dollar case. The random codes for 
the managing NCBs or NCB pools are consistent throughout the sample period. Therefore, since eight 
NCBs or NCB pools have continued to manage a dollar portfolio after currency specialization, in their 
case we collect explanatory variables in both regimes (96 monthly observations). The remaining four 
NCBs have withdrawn from the dollar as from 2006, and we thus collect the variables only until 2005 
(48 observations). 
We note inter alia that manager 10, who was active until 2005, always kept a neutral duration position 
(Duration risk=0 on average) and a small spread risk exposure. Manager 5 maintained on average a nil 
spread exposure. Among the moderate duration risk and spread risk-takers we also note manager 12. 
Manager 8 is the one who  likes  taking risks most, showing  relatively  high values  for  average  
Duration risk (0.07  years), Spread risk (0.21 years) and Curve risk (0.59 years), although he achieves 
this with a low value of Turnover (0.49, i.e. 49 per cent of portfolio size). 
Table 3 provides analogous statistics for the yen portfolios. In this case we collect explanatory 
variables for six NCBs throughout the sample period, while for the remainder we only have data for 
the uniform approach period of 2002-2005. Interestingly, we observe that a large number of reserve 
managers does not take spread risk positions: some of them left the tournament as from 2006 (M1, 
M3, M4, M5), while others are still active under currency specialization (M2, M10, M11, M12). On 
average the yen managers show lower Turnover values compared with the dollar managers. The 
traders with an average turnover ratio above unity are M4 and M8, who left in 2006, plus M6 and M9, 
who are still in the game. 
A general remark on these statistics is that Turnover, our effort proxy, varies widely among reserve 
managers, particularly in the dollar case. One reason may be related to the dispersion in the absolute 
size of the portfolios. Smaller portfolios are more flexible to manage because they involve a lower 
absolute transaction size to achieve any given relative risk position. Besides, some managers may 
actively use futures contracts or liquidity management operations, involving a higher gross turnover. 21
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The summary statistics on the USD control variables between 2002 and 2009 are listed in Table 4, 
while Table 5 gives the corresponding figures for the yen market. The dollar market variables show 
higher average values and greater dispersion compared with the yen variables. 
4 The effect of ranking 
We recall our key question: does ranking in its twofold characterization (year-to-date and from 
previous year) affect risk-taking and effort at the individual level? For this purpose we adopt a 
stepwise approach. In this section we present the results of the following regressions starting with the 
dollar (the currency subscript is omitted for simplicity): 
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where the dependent variable Y is represented alternatively by Duration risk, Spread risk, Curve risk, 
Turnover. We use panel regression estimates with fixed effects, measured by the  i u  term. This 
specification involves a number of simplifying assumptions. In particular, all relationships among the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables are assumed to be linear. The presence of individual 
effects is captured by  i u : risk-taking and effort between any two portfolio managers i and j may differ 
only by a constant shift factor equal to  ) ( j i u u − , and over time all managers are assumed to react in 
the same way to changes in the explanatory variables. 
The dependent variables are extremely volatile and complex to model, reflecting a number of factors 
and idiosyncratic preferences that are difficult to capture with the available explanatory variables. Not 
surprisingly, the R-squared values that we obtain are rather low. Nonetheless, for our hypothesis 
testing we rely on the coefficients t-statistics computed with robust standard errors. 
Table 6 presents the results of equation (1) for the dollar portfolios where the dependent variable is 
Duration risk. The first column section lists the results for the entire sample period. It shows a highly 
significant constant term equal to 0.07 years and the negative effect of both the term spread and the 
Ted spread on duration risk. The base effect of ranking () 1 γ  is nil. Risk-shifting however takes place 
in the second semester, as revealed by a positive and highly significant value of  2 γ , equal to 0.006. 22
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This implies that, other things being equal, the reserve manager with the lowest interim ranking (H2
rank=8) displays a greater value of duration risk compared with the average rank (H2 rank=4.5) by 
(0.006*3.5=) 0.021 years. Interestingly, the value of  3 γ  equal to -0.006 shows that risk-shifting is 
entirely offset if the portfolio manager has achieved a positive performance. This reveals that risk-
shifting takes place asymmetrically around the value of the benchmark return. The reserve managers 
who achieve a positive interim performance do not adjust duration risk; those that remain below the 
benchmark shift duration risk in line with their ranking position in the second half of the year. 
Turning to the effect of past year ranking, we find an insignificant base coefficient  1 δ . Risk-shifting 
materializes in the second half of the year, when the value of  2 δ , highly significant and equal to -
0.006, shows that losers in the previous tournament reduce duration risk, as could be conjectured on 
the basis of the managers’ anecdotal evidence. Again, we find an asymmetry around the benchmark 
return: the value of  3 δ , equal to 0.005, reveals an almost full offset of the past ranking effect for 
reserve managers who are currently above the benchmark return. 
We also ran equation (1) separately during the uniform management period and the currency 
specialization period. The results for duration risk are reported in Table 6 in the second and third 
column section respectively. In the uniform management period the market variables are no longer 
significant, while the risk-shifting coefficients are smaller and show the same patterns as in the 
regression for the entire sample: asymmetric duration risk-shifting occurs as a response to current 
ranking  () 2 3 3 2 , 0 , 0 γ γ γ γ = < >  as well as to past year ranking () 3 2 3 2 , 0 , 0 δ δ δ δ = > < . In 
the currency specialization period duration risk responds negatively to the term spread and to the Ted 
spread, while most of the risk-shifting effects are no longer significant. The only significant effect is 
related to Last year rank, the base variable which covers the whole year, with  008 . 0 1 − = δ . While in 
the years 2002-2005 the effect of past ranking on current duration risk was found in the second 
semester only, during 2006-2009 the reserve managers’ concern about their past score is more 
pervasive: it weighs on duration risk choices all year round, and independently of the level of 
performance. 
The estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread in the dollar portfolios are reported in Table 7. In 
the full sample period we note that spread risk varies inversely with the Ted spread and directly with 
bond futures volatility. The base effect of Rank is equal to -0.009. In the second semester, the estimate 
of  2 γ  turns positive as expected and is equal to 0.023, while we observe again the offset of   
020 . 0 3 − = γ . In the second half of the year the total effect of cumulated ranking is given by 
( ) 006 . 0 3 2 1 2 − = + + γ γ γ  for positive performers, and by () 014 . 0 2 1 + = +γ γ  for negative performers. 
This is evidence of spread risk-shifting also by the reserve managers who are ranking well (to the 
extent that this is associated with positive performance), and not only by those performing below the 23
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benchmark, as in the case of duration risk. Past year ranking has a low base effect () 003 . 0 1 = δ  with a 
moderate significance level. In the second semester negative performers shift risk () 015 . 0 2 1 − = +δ δ , 
whereas positive performers practically do not ( ) 001 . 0 3 2 1 + = + + δ δ δ .  
In the uniform management period we find broadly similar results compared with the full sample 
regression: both interim ranking and past year ranking show an impact on current spread risk choices, 
with the same patterns as described above. It is interesting to note that in the currency specialization 
period the number of significant ranking coefficients diminishes, and the effect of interim ranking for 
negative performers in the second semester becomes greater (0.010 as opposed to 0.005). 
Table 8 presents the results of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. This is affected negatively by the 
term spread and the Ted spread, and positively by bond futures volatility. Risk-shifting related to 
interim ranking occurs mainly for negative performers in the second semester ( ) 068 . 0 2 1 = +γ γ ; it is 
practically nil for positive performers, while it reverses () 009 . 0 1 − = γ  in the first semester. In the 
second part of the year we observe the usual negative effect of past year ranking on curve risk, which 
is strong for negative performers (-0.065) and much smaller for positive performers 
() 006 . 0 3 2 − = +δ δ .  
The comparison between the two subperiods reveals that currency specialization brings about a 
marked reduction in the extent of curve risk-shifting related to interim ranking. In particular, in the 
second semester negative performers have a cumulative effect equal to +0.062 in the first subperiod 
and to +0.036 in the second subperiod. The corresponding effect for positive performers diminishes in 
absolute terms, from -0.007 to -0.002. These patterns are the opposite of those found for spread risk.  
Table 9 gives the results for Turnover. This variable responds inversely to the size of the term spread 
and to bond volatility. We detect a significant value of  3 γ , equal to -0.157: in the second semester low 
ranking reserve managers reduce turnover, to the extent that they have achieved positive performance. 
Past year ranking has an inverse effect on turnover ( ) 156 . 0 2 − = δ ; however this effect is more than 
compensated for if the manager has achieved a positive performance () 048 . 0 3 2 = +δ δ . The latter 
finding seems consistent with the notion that, once reserve managers have achieved a positive 
performance, they deploy an extra effort, e.g. in security selection, to improve their ranking position. 
The coefficient estimates for the two subperiods reveal the presence of ranking-related adjustments in 
turnover only under the uniform management regime. 
To obtain a clearer picture of adjustment patterns under the two regimes, Table 10 reports summary 
evidence on the ranking-related effects on risk and turnover estimated for the second semester. We 
observe that some types of risk-shifting diminish under currency specialization, while others become 
greater. In the first group we can include the adjustment of curve risk following the interim ranking 24
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results, and of spread risk and curve risk following past year ranking.
8  We also notice that the 
adjustment of turnover to either type of ranking loses significance under currency specialization. The 
second group includes the adjustment of spread risk to the interim ranking results and that of duration 
risk to past year ranking. The first of these effects may partly be related to the increase in size and 
volatility of credit spreads in the years 2006-2009 compared with the first subperiod. Overall currency 
specialization is associated with a reduction in the extent of risk-shifting for the dollar reserve 
managers. However risk-shifting is still present. 
The evidence so far lends support to the view that the ECB’s reserve managers strategically adjust 
their risk-taking and, to a lesser extent, turnover to changes in their relative ranking, both from the 
previous year and year-to-date. While enhanced risk-taking by the interim losers in the second 
semester is in line with the tournament hypothesis, the finding that low performance in the previous 
annual tournament causes a reduction in risk exposure can be attributed to the emergence of risk 
aversion - a phenomenon that seems to be absent in the mutual funds market, where the tournament is 
much less rigid and where losing the yearly tournament twice in a row is probably perceived as less 
damaging by portfolio managers. 
Next we turn to the group of estimates for the yen portfolios, presented in the same sequence as for the 
dollar. Table 11 gives the results for Duration risk. In the entire sample period this variable responds 
positively to the term spread and the OIS spread. Interim ranking has an opposite, although small, 
effect on duration risk () 004 . 0 1 − = γ . No other types of risk adjustment are found. In the uniform 
management period we find that risk-shifting reverses sign in the second semester () 003 . 0 2 1 = +γ γ , 
and that past year ranking displays a negative effect on duration risk. Under currency specialization we 
are left with a single coefficient, with mild significance, and the “wrong” sign () 012 . 0 2 − = γ . 
The results for Spread risk are given in Table 12. In this case low performers do increase risk 
positions, and more so in the second part of the year  () 014 . 0 2 1 = +γ γ . Past year losers reduce spread 
risk in the second semester. These patterns are present in the uniform management period but 
disappear with currency specialization. 
Table 13 shows the estimates for Curve risk. While in the entire period there is no evidence of risk-
shifting, in the first subperiod we find the “familiar” tournament effects: low interim ranking causes an 
increase in risk-taking, which becomes more pronounced in the second semester () 045 . 0 2 1 = +γ γ ; 
however this phenomenon is almost fully offset by reserve managers with positive performance 
() 005 . 0 3 2 1 = + + γ γ γ . In the same subperiod, past year ranking displays a negative effect on risk-
                                                           
8 Strictly speaking, in the subperiod 2002-2005 the lowest ranking manager has a Rank (or Last year rank) equal 
to 8, while the highest ranking manager, owing to normalization, has a value equal to (1/12 x 8=) 0.67. This 
introduces an upward bias in the size of the coefficient estimates of the first subperiod. 
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taking throughout the year () 012 . 0 1 − = δ . Under currency specialization we notice a significant 
coefficient on the variable H2 rank, although with an unusual negative sign. 
The results for turnover are shown in Table 14. In the full sample the only significant coefficients are 
098 . 0 3 − = γ  and  032 . 0 1 − = δ , presenting familiar signs. In the uniform management period there is 
no evidence of turnover adjustment, while under currency specialization we notice a significant value 
of   1 γ , equal to 0.063 and showing that interim low ranking causes an increase in effort. 
Table 15 reports summary evidence on the effects of ranking on yen portfolio risk and turnover in the 
second semester. The picture differs somewhat from the dollar case. We do not have a plausible 
explanation for the switch in the sign of the effect of interim ranking on duration risk and curve risk in 
the currency specialization years. We notice however that in those years the shifting of spread risk 
looses significance and that reserve managers adjust turnover to interim ranking instead. The effect of 
past year ranking disappears for three variables out of four. 
5 Individual effects 
In our stepwise test approach, we move on to release some of the assumptions used so far. In this 
section we allow for the possibility that individual effects appear not only as a constant component 
over time, but also via different reactions to the ranking variables. For this purpose the panel 
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where the dummy variables 
j
t i D ,  are manager specific, and range over (j, t, c) with value 1 in the 
months t when manager j is active in currency c, and 0 otherwise (the currency subscript is omitted for 
simplicity). As before, the dependent variable Y is represented alternatively by Duration risk, Spread
risk, Curve risk, Turnover. We set out to test the hypothesis that reserve managers adjust risk positions 
and effort individually in a systematic way as a function of year-to-date ranking and past year ranking, 
allowing for the possibility that they modify their response in the second semester, and that they do so 
asymmetrically conditional upon achieving positive performance. This regression approach comes at 
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the cost of a much larger number of coefficients to estimate, which inevitably reduces the efficiency of 
the estimates, since a large fraction of individual effects does not exist in practice and this amplifies 
the standard errors of the “true” effects.
9 The t-statistic, even if downward biased, continues to provide 
a reliable instrument for hypothesis testing. 
The listing of the results of the eight regressions would be overly detailed. Therefore in Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively for the dollar and the yen, we provide evidence only on the γ and  δ  
coefficients from equation (2) that turned out to be significant in the two distinct subperiods, ignoring 
for simplicity the results covering the entire sample, the effects of the market variables, the constant α  
and all the insignificant coefficient estimates. To enhance readability we compiled in Table 16 a 
selection of the results for the dollar (from Appendix Table 1), where we omitted the four portfolio 
managers who have no longer been active in that currency since 2006. While we note that two dollar 
managers (M4 and M5, from Appendix Table 1) present no significant ranking effect, Table 16 shows 
a wide variety of individual effects for the remaining six dollar managers. One extreme of moderation 
in this group is represented by M11 who, under currency specialization, reduces spread risk in 
response to a low past year ranking. At the other extreme we observe M8, who appears as a systematic 
risk- and turnover-adjuster. This reserve manager displays recognizable effects: low interim ranking 
causes an increase in spread risk and curve risk in the second semester; interestingly, these effects 
become greater under currency specialization. However turnover is reduced after low year-to-date 
ranking. With two exceptions, this reserve manager reacts in the same fashion independently of 
whether his return is above or below the benchmark. Looking back at the entire group of eight dollar 
managers who were active before and after currency specialization, and considering the four 
dependent variables, we have 32 combinations. As shown in Table 16, we have estimated the presence 
of one or more significant individual effects, related to either definition of ranking, in 11 cases out of 
32, or 34 per cent. We recall that this figure is, if anything, biased downwards by the regression 
approach and by the choice to present the results for the subperiods.
10 
Table 17 provides the individual effects for the yen, using the same simplified format as in Table 16. 
We observe an even greater range of estimates. As was the case with the aggregate results of Tables 
11-14, some of these individual effects can be interpreted less clearly than those for the dollar. 
Managers M11 and M12 generally display regular patterns across the four dependent variables 
(interim ranking displays a positive coefficient, past year ranking has a negative coefficient), and in a 
number of cases they react asymmetrically depending on their position relative to the benchmark 
return. In the entire group of six yen managers who were active before and after currency 
                                                           
9 The alternative of dropping the insignificant variables and re-estimating the equations would be very 
cumbersome.  
10 Owing to the large number of coefficients, we do not go through the standard procedure from general to 
particular, whereby subsequent regression rounds leave out the variables that did not turn out to be significant at 
the previous stage. 27
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specialization, and considering the four dependent variables, we have 24 combinations. Out of these, 
we have estimated the presence of one or more individual effects in 16 cases, corresponding to 67 per 
cent of the total combinations. 
To conduct robustness checks of our results, we also performed regressions (1) and (2) under 
alternative, milder assumptions. In particular, we ran separate regressions over reserve managers of 
both large and small portfolios.
11  These showed that those managing a large or a small portfolio 
behave differently, whereas they tend to display similar reactions within-group. This phenomenon may 
partly be explained by closer scrutiny among the next of kin, and by the different flexibility afforded 
by small versus large portfolios. In achieving the same risk positions and turnover, reserve managers 
of small portfolios clearly benefit from the fact that the absolute size of the transactions involved is 
also small. 
Although showing different nuances and changes over time/individual effects, the robustness checks 
point to the same general conclusion: both aggregate regressions of type (1) and individual effect 
regressions of type (2) reveal that ranking has a systematic impact on risk-taking and effort, as proxied 
by turnover. 
6 Risk and performance 
Are risk and effort rewarded? Or, put differently, can the adjustment of risk positions and turnover 
generate outperformance in a systematic fashion? The answer to this question would provide 
complementary information on the effect of the risk/effort relations documented in the previous two 
sections. Indeed, a devil’s advocate might argue that outperforming a (fixed-income) benchmark 
portfolio, dynamically reviewed every month, is no easy task (see e.g. Chen, Ferson and Peters, 2010) 
and as such there could not be any systematic reward to risk and effort. Outperformance would 
materialize occasionally as the outcome of fortunate market timing and security selection. In such a 
world, the existence of a risk-ranking relation would add idiosyncratic noise without much harm in 
return. If, on the other hand, we could show that risk and effort may systematically contribute to 
outperformance for (at least some) managers, then the risk-ranking relation of the previous two 
sections should be taken more seriously even by the sceptics, and the notion that distortions in 
individual choices lead overall to suboptimal results would be reinforced. The performance 
consequences of risk-shifting in the case of US mutual funds have been analysed recently by Huang, 
Sialm and Zhang (2011), who find that risk-shifters tend to perform worse than funds that maintain 
stable risk levels. While the above study presents extensive coverage of equity mutual funds over a 
long time period, we address a much simpler setting. We limit ourselves to checking for the existence 
of systematic effects of risk/effort on performance via the following regression: 28
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where  t i R ,  is the performance (+/-) in basis points of manager i relative to the tactical benchmark in 
month t. A significant t-test on any of the η  coefficients would indicate that the risk positions/effort 
undertaken by the respective portfolio manager would be systematically rewarded, contributing 
positively (or negatively) to contemporaneous monthly performance. 
This type of check (we deliberately do not call it a test) on the implications of the ranking relations is 
extremely rigorous. Even if we found that no manager is able to adjust risk and/or effort to achieve a 
systematically better performance, it would still be the case that ranking diverts individual choices 
away from the pursuit of the optimal risk and effort related to the manager’s views (the “signal”) over 
fundamental market developments. 
The results of regression equation (3) for the dollar and the yen are very interesting (they are not 
reported in detail for brevity). In the dollar case, using the 5 per cent confidence level, we find that two 
portfolio managers display positive and significant η ’s. In particular, M8 shows a value of  2 4 = η : by 
raising (reducing) Turnover at the right (wrong) time, this reserve manager systematically makes a 
contribution to outperformance (underperformance). M6 has  31 2 = η . In the yen case, the same 
reserve manager has  2 . 0 4 = η . M10 shows a value of  3 . 2 3 = η : adjusting curve risk suitably this 
manager makes a statistically significant contribution to performance. In some instances we also find 
negative and significant values of the η ’s. This implies that some managers take risk decisions that 
systematically have a negative impact on their contemporaneous performance. This is an unfortunate 
indication that higher risk is not necessarily associated with a higher return, which is of course nothing 
new in finance. However, one should bear in mind that today’s decisions may be related to future 
performance prospects, something that we do not look into. We leave a full-blown test of causality 
between risk decisions and performance as a subject for future research. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 The results are available from the authors upon request. 29
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7 Normative considerations 
The previous empirical analysis raises two issues concerning the reserve management framework: the 
assessment horizon for portfolio choices and the structure of reputational reward. 
Recognising that investment opportunities and risk premia are time-varying, and that bond returns are 
to some extent predictable,
12 once a year the top investment layer revises the strategic benchmark by 
means of a dynamic optimization process. The resulting benchmark is thus of the “active” type, since 
it exploits the conditional return distribution based on the available information set and has an 
investment horizon of twelve months.
13 The tactical layer in turn exploits any update in the conditional 
return distribution on a monthly basis. Third comes the actual portfolio, which adds the knowledge of 
day-by-day market developments. While the ECB’s guidelines state that the objective of the tactical 
benchmark is to outperform the strategic benchmark within an investment horizon of three months, the 
mandate of the actual portfolios is not explicit over their assessment horizon. On the one hand, the link 
with the accounting results and general market practice support the present choice of the annual 
horizon, implicit in the reporting frequency to the Governing Council. On the other hand, it might be 
argued that owing to specialization motives, the horizon of the actual portfolios should be shorter than 
that of the tactical benchmark. By using superior short-term analysis skills and information which is 
not taken into account at the tactical level, a short-term orientation of the third layer of management 
would maximize the probability to add outperformance and make an efficient use of the risk budget 
(Cardon and Coche, 2004; Koivu, Monar and Nyholm, 2009). In this perspective, it could be argued 
that the appropriate horizon for the assessment of actual portfolios is one month. In principle the 
hypothesis that the portfolio horizon is three months, as for the tactical benchmark, cannot be 
discarded altogether. However we observe that, by analogy with the relationship between the strategic 
horizon (twelve months) and the tactical horizon (three months), the appropriate horizon going one 
step down should be shorter. To sum up, the one-month horizon would seem superior to the one year 
horizon on two grounds: specialization and internal consistency. 
In the presence of stochastic returns, typically portfolio choice problems seek to specify an objective 
function for the owner of the funds, where the degree of risk tolerance plays a crucial role in finding 
the balance between risk and return. This also applies to our framework, in which the ECB’s long-term 
risk/return preferences are incorporated in the strategic benchmark, while the medium-term 
preferences against the background of market conditions steer the tactical benchmark. Thus the two 
benchmarks reflect and reveal the preferences of the decision-making bodies, and tight risk limits are 
assigned to the portfolios. 
                                                           
12 See for example Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
13 Van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2008) discuss the use of an unconditional (“passive”) benchmark jointly 
with strategic asset allocation decisions in a decentralized investment management framework. 30
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Should risk and return then be further traded-off at the portfolio level? If the objective of each 
portfolio were to outperform the tactical benchmark within a one-month horizon, then risk concerns by 
the portfolio managers should be confined to the effect of within-month volatility of asset returns, 
which may induce managers to time the market and to perform security selection in the day-by-day 
investment process. Under the assumption that the portfolio horizon is one month, the manager’s 
optimization problem can be described by a simple one-period model: 
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k w w          (4) 
 
where  p R ,  b R ,  k R  denote the return respectively on the portfolio, on the benchmark and on asset k at 
the end of the month,  k w  are the weights of each asset in the portfolio,  b
k w  are the benchmark 
weights, set at the beginning of the month and held constant thereafter. The optimization problem is 
also subject to various risk constraints, not reported for simplicity. Eq. (4) says that the optimal 
portfolio weights are chosen by managers as deviations from the benchmark weights in order to 
maximize expected performance at the end of the month. A corollary is that we would expect to see 
very often that managers’ risk positions represent corner solutions, i.e. adhering to these preferences 
would involve an active use of the entire risk budgets. There seems to be no role for strategic risk-
shifting based on ranking and/or performance during the year or in the previous year. 
The second normative issue is related to the design of compensation. Within the current rules, which 
basically involve the award of reputational credit, an implicit feature of the tournament consists in the 
concavity of the reward to annual performance, related to capital preservation concerns. These induce 
a degree of risk aversion at the portfolio management level which may go against the pursuit of return. 
Finding the right balance between risk and return in the investment of foreign reserves is the task of 
the general rules of the framework, which we do not call into question. However we can point out 
some arguments for reviewing the award of reputation. 
A standard result in the design of optimal labour contracts is that a worker’s incentives to invest in 
effort increase with the spread between winning and losing prizes; therefore the principal would want 
to increase the spread to induce greater investment and generate higher output, subject to participation 
and cost constraints (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). In a delegated investment 
setting, Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010) have recently studied the portfolio manager’s 
optimal compensation under the hypothesis that she exerts a costly effort to influence the quality of a 31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1377
September 2011
private signal about future market prices.
14 If effort is not observable, the incentive-compatible 
contract gives the manager a payoff proportional to the investor’s payoff plus a fraction of the excess 
return of the portfolio over a passive benchmark. If neither the effort nor the signal are observable, 
then excess return strategies would tend to make the portfolio manager overly conservative. Thus in 
this case the optimal contract is one that rewards the manager for trading more aggressively on the 
basis of “extreme” information.  
The implication for our framework, where portfolio managers’ private signals and effort are largely 
unobservable, is that the reward function should include a prize for positive performance. 
Furthermore, to limit excessive prudence and indexing behaviour, the shape of reward should possibly 
be convex. This would elicit effort towards market timing and security selection at the level of the 
actual portfolios. 
Under the assumptions that i) the portfolio horizon should maintain a short-term orientation and ii) an 
incentive-compatible reputational reward should be assigned to portfolio managers, we ask the 
question: can the design of performance ranking help towards those two objectives? If this were the 
case, the framework could attain an efficiency improvement even without changing its policy 
principles. 




t i i outcome f SCORE
1
, , that is the final score of 
contestant i in the tournament is computed over a suitable horizon T as the sum of a function evaluated 
at each round t. In the reserve management tournament the arguments are the individual’s positive 
outcomes (portfolio outperformance) or negative outcomes (underperformance) in each round. The 
current formula adopts a cardinal and linear function  () ⋅ f , which returns a value in the same 
measurement unit (basis points). There is only one round t coinciding with T (one year) or twelve 
monthly rounds (which is equivalent) with time additive scores: negative performance 
[ ] ( ) 0 , min , , t b t i R R −  weighs as much as positive performance  [ ] ( ) 0 , max , , t b t i R R −  at each monthly 
round. 
There are in principle several alternatives to the present system. We limit ourselves to a qualitative 
sketch of the “ideal” ranking mechanism, which could aim at fulfilling four objectives: 
a) align the timeframe of investment decisions with the horizon preferred by the owner (time
coherence);  
b) eliminate or limit the correlation of portfolio decisions with the past (forward orientation); 
                                                           
14 The inclusion in the model of security returns with a spanning of market states overcomes the irrelevance 
result (Stoughton, 1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997), according to which benchmarking does not provide the 
right incentives and leads to underinvestment of effort. 32
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c) reduce the tendency of interim winners to view themselves as final winners too early during the 
year (effort); 
d) encourage the intermediate performers, as well as the losers, to make the best use of their risk 
budgets (risk-taking). 
For simplicity we present two possible options. They would keep the monthly observation frequency 
and the yearly assessment horizon T as at present. 
Option 1 – Each round t lasts one month. The function  () ⋅ f  remains cardinal but it presents a convex 
kink, by assigning a score of 0 to underperformance (the negative outcome). 
Option 2 - Each round lasts one month as before. The function  () ⋅ f  is ordinal and mildly convex. The 
positive outcomes are defined as the top N/2 performance values, N being the number of portfolio 
managers (if not an integer, N/2 might be rounded down). The first dollar (yen) manager would obtain 
(the integer part of) N/2 points, the second would get N/2-1, …, down to zero for the portfolio 
managers with the lower N/2 performances. Alternatively, the positive outcomes might be defined as 
the top N/2 conditional on achieving outperformance. 
The two options present an increasing order of reward to effort and risk-taking. The system currently 
in use does not seem to promote time coherence and forward orientation by the managers. By ignoring 
all negative performance months, Option 1 would break the intertemporal substitutability of outcomes, 
thus eliciting greater time coherence, effort and risk-taking. Option 2, by adopting the ordinal function, 
would introduce an additional incentive to risk-taking and the pursuit of a better performance. For 
example, the top scorer would get one more point compared with the second one, no matter how close 
the latter is. This option could make a contribution to all four objectives. 
 
8 Conclusions 
We have presented the main features of the investment framework for the ECB’s foreign reserves and 
provided empirical evidence on the relationships among portfolio risk choices, managerial effort and 
relative performance. A peculiar tournament takes place among reserve managers, who are located at 
different national central banks and share a common benchmark. Although the features of this setting 
differ from the mutual fund industry, we have empirically found that the tournament hypothesis 
extensively studied in the literature holds also in our case. Interim losers increase relative risk in the 
second half of the year in an attempt to catch up, while interim winners in some cases reduce risk and 
tend to follow more closely the benchmark to lock-in their gains. We also found that the impact of 
ranking may be asymmetric, depending on whether the reserve manager has achieved a positive 
performance against the benchmark. In a number of cases those that are outperforming the benchmark 
lessen the extent of risk adjustment, consistently with the managers’ narrative according to which 33
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outperforming the benchmark is the primary objective for most of them, while ranking takes only 
second place.  
Effort, as proxied by turnover, is significantly affected by ranking, particularly in the yen case and 
since the move to currency specialization. More generally, to the extent that the act of risk-taking 
involves more hard work, as suggested in the literature, our risk-shifting evidence reinforces the 
conclusion that reserve managers shift effort on the basis of ranking as well. 
The finding that past year losers reduce risk seems an original feature of the ECB’s reserve 
management tournament. We have discussed this evidence in relation to a reward function of 
reputational nature over annual performance, described by some portfolio managers as being concave. 
The results showing strategic risk-shifting in a bond portfolio contest offer proof of the pervasiveness 
of tournament incentives. This may have indirect implications also for the private sector, and future 
research could extend the analysis of tournament behaviour to the case of bond mutual funds.
In the ECB foreign reserves case, our exploratory analysis of the appropriate horizon for investment 
decisions and the structure of reward suggests that a review of the ranking system might better align 
the incentives offered to foreign reserve managers with the ECB’s preferences. A new solution could 
increase the reward for effort and performance via a convex scoring system linked to monthly, rather 
than annual, results. 
With a view to aligning incentives and preferences, more innovative changes could be considered. 
These would however involve some revision of the general principles of the investment framework, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 34
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USD JPY Total
1999 28 -7 24
2000 10 2 9
2001 6 0.4 5
2002 -4 9 -3
2003 6 -1 5
2004 0.2 -7 -1
2005 19 2 16
2006 11 4 10
2007 5 0.1 4
2008 41 22 37
2009 28 8 23
2010 10 8 9
Average 13.3 3.4 11.6
Returns over benchmark, basis points.
Table 1: Performance of ECB foreign reserve management37
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
M1 Duration risk 96 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.76
Spread risk 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.35
Curve risk 0.30 0.22 0.04 1.43
Turnover 2.80 1.85 0.51 8.92
M2 Duration risk 48 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12
Spread risk 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.39
Curve risk 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.56
Turnover 3.92 1.76 1.27 8.04
M3 Duration risk 96 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.34
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.14
Curve risk 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.41
Turnover 2.89 1.83 0.36 7.91
M4 Duration risk 96 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.20
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15
Curve risk 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.25
Turnover 3.45 1.50 0.95 13.19
M5 Duration risk 96 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.31
Spread risk 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06
Curve risk 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.53
Turnover 2.66 1.00 0.29 4.20
M6 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.43
Curve risk 0.41 0.47 0.00 1.90
Turnover 8.26 4.52 1.77 18.19
M7 Duration risk 96 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.16
Spread risk 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.21
Curve risk 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.43
Turnover 4.82 2.39 0.40 13.36
M8 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.24
Spread risk 0.21 0.26 0.00 1.28
Curve risk 0.59 0.52 0.02 2.51
Turnover 0.49 0.84 0.00 4.78
M9 Duration risk 96 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.46
Spread risk 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.20
Curve risk 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.69
Turnover 5.55 2.48 1.12 11.81
M10 Duration risk 48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Spread risk 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06
Curve risk 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.20
Turnover 1.56 0.59 0.38 3.17
M11 Duration risk 96 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.27
Spread risk 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18
Curve risk 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.52
Turnover 2.71 1.13 0.39 5.21
M12 Duration risk 48 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
Spread risk 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.15
Curve risk 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.52
Turnover 4.19 1.67 1.03 7.69
Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk are in duration contribution years. Turnover is a ratio over portfolio size
Table 2: USD dependent variables - Summary statistics38
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
M1 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.39
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Curve risk 0.24 0.16 0.07 0.82
Turnover 0.53 0.54 0.00 2.31
M2 Duration risk 96 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.32
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.41 0.20 0.05 1.02
Turnover 0.61 0.45 0.02 3.13
M3 Duration risk 48 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.17
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.32
Turnover 0.36 0.33 0.00 1.25
M4 Duration risk 48 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.31
Turnover 1.45 1.96 0.04 7.57
M5 Duration risk 48 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.24
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.28 0.19 0.03 0.76
Turnover 0.76 0.66 0.06 3.17
M6 Duration risk 96 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.33
Spread risk 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.23
Curve risk 0.51 0.36 0.11 1.60
Turnover 1.57 1.28 0.02 7.79
M7 Duration risk 48 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.23
Curve risk 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.63
Turnover 0.29 0.39 0.01 2.59
M8 Duration risk 48 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.28
Spread risk 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.68
Curve risk 0.68 0.37 0.25 1.57
Turnover 1.51 2.30 0.00 10.84
M9 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.21
Spread risk 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.17
Curve risk 0.22 0.15 0.00 0.58
Turnover 1.01 0.94 0.05 4.55
M10 Duration risk 96 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.18
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.64
Turnover 0.34 0.34 0.00 2.31
M11 Duration risk 96 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.25
Spread risk 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Curve risk 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.57
Turnover 0.53 0.52 0.01 4.12
M12 Duration risk 96 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.27
Spread risk 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Curve risk 0.43 0.42 0.03 1.70
Turnover 0.49 0.44 0.00 1.65
Duration risk, Spread risk and Curve risk are in duration contribution years. Turnover is a ratio over portfolio size
Table 3: JPY dependent variables - Summary statistics
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Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Term spread 96 1.35 0.95 -0.15 2.70
Ted spread 0.53 0.55 0.12 3.14
Bond volatility 6.92 2.52 3.00 14.10
All variables are in percentage points.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Term spread 96 1.05 0.24 0.49 1.64
OIS spread 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.73
Bond volatility 3.81 1.32 1.40 7.60
All variables are in percentage points.
Table 4: USD market variables - Summary statistics
Table 5: JPY market variables - Summary statistics
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Term spread -1 -0.014 *** -0.008 -0.019 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Ted spread -1 -0.015 *** 0.016 -0.019 **
(0.005) (0.034) (0.008)
Bond volatility -1 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Rank -1 0.000 -0.002 * 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
H2 rank 0.006 *** 0.004 ** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
H2 above bmk -0.006 *** -0.004 * -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Last year rank -0.001 0.001 -0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
H2 last year -0.006 *** -0.004 ** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
H2 last above 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
constant 0.066 *** 0.040 ** 0.105 ***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Duration risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1 0.007 -0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Ted spread -1 -0.024 *** -0.187 ** -0.013 **
(0.008) (0.081) (0.006)
Bond volatility -1 0.005 * 0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Rank -1 -0.009 *** -0.015 *** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
H2 rank 0.023 *** 0.020 *** 0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
H2 above bmk -0.020 *** -0.014 *** -0.008 ***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Last year rank 0.003 * 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
H2 last year -0.018 *** -0.015 *** -0.007 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
H2 last above 0.016 *** 0.012 *** 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
constant 0.062 *** 0.136 *** 0.056 ***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.012)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread risk. Robust standard errors









Table 6: Duration risk - USD portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
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Term spread -1 -0.028 ** -0.056 ** -0.003
(0.014) (0.025) (0.017)
Ted spread -1 -0.045 ** -0.387 ** -0.035 **
(0.018) (0.170) (0.017)
Bond volatility -1 0.016 *** 0.028 *** 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Rank -1 -0.009 ** -0.015 *** -0.009 *
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
H2 rank 0.077 *** 0.077 *** 0.045 ***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
H2 above bmk -0.069 *** -0.069 *** -0.038 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Last year rank 0.003 0.001 -0.008 *
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
H2 last year -0.065 *** -0.064 *** -0.033 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
H2 last above 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.027 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
constant 0.169 *** 0.245 *** 0.308 ***
(0.033) (0.089) (0.036)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1 -0.244 * -0.277 -0.581 ***
(0.126) (0.202) (0.199)
Ted spread -1 -0.234 -0.065 -0.074
(0.163) (1.373) (0.196)
Bond volatility -1 -0.125 ** -0.106 -0.071
(0.053) (0.082) (0.072)
Rank -1 -0.019 -0.101 ** -0.006
(0.037) (0.046) (0.057)
H2 rank 0.100 -0.028 0.105
(0.063) (0.082) (0.097)
H2 above bmk -0.157 ** -0.036 -0.125
(0.069) (0.094) (0.101)
Last year rank -0.004 -0.080 ** -0.073
(0.030) (0.039) (0.052)
H2 last year -0.156 *** -0.087 -0.077
(0.059) (0.070) (0.109)
H2 last above 0.204 *** 0.142 * 0.104
(0.061) (0.074) (0.110)
constant 4.860 *** 5.902 *** 4.474 ***
(0.295) (0.722) (0.416)
obs 948 564 384




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Turnover. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
2002-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
Table 9: Turnover - USD portfolios
Table 8: Curve risk - USD portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
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2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
Negative 
performers
Ȗ1+Ȗ2 0.002 0 0.005 0.010 0.062 0.036 -0.101 0
Positive 
performers
Ȗ1+Ȗ2+Ȗ3 -0.002 0 -0.009 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.101 0
Negative 
performers
į1+į2 -0.004 -0.008 -0.015 -0.007 -0.064 -0.041 -0.080 0
Positive 
performers
į1+į2+į3 0 -0.008 -0.003 0 -0.005 -0.014 0.062 0




Table 10: Ranking effects in second semester - USD portfolios
Duration risk Spread risk Curve risk Turnover
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Term spread -1 0.029 ** 0.030 ** 0.089 ***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.030)
Ted spread -1 0.050 ** -1.126 *** 0.149 ***
(0.020) (0.309) (0.029)
Bond volatility -1 0.000 -0.003 0.008 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Rank -1 -0.004 ** -0.004 * 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
H2 rank 0.002 0.007 * -0.012 *
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
H2 above bmk -0.004 -0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Last year rank 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
H2 last year -0.003 -0.006 *** 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
H2 last above 0.001 0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
constant 0.072 *** 0.134 *** -0.058
(0.015) (0.018) (0.037)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Duration risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1 -0.029 *** -0.025 -0.016
(0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
Ted spread -1 -0.030 -0.540 -0.005
(0.018) (0.343) (0.011)
Bond volatility -1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Rank -1 0.009 *** 0.015 *** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
H2 rank 0.005 * 0.008 * 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
H2 above bmk -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Last year rank 0.002 * 0.003 ** 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
H2 last year -0.004 * -0.006 ** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
H2 last above 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
constant 0.019 0.014 0.029 **
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Spread risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 11: Duration risk - JPY portfolios
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Term spread -1 -0.001 -0.127 *** 0.425 ***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.081)
Ted spread -1 0.132 * -1.910 * 0.631 ***
(0.072) (0.996) (0.079)
Bond volatility -1 -0.030 *** -0.014 * -0.038 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Rank -1 0.002 0.015 ** 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
H2 rank 0.009 0.030 ** -0.040 **
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020)
H2 above bmk -0.013 -0.040 *** 0.027
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Last year rank -0.004 -0.012 *** -0.013
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011)
H2 last year 0.000 -0.011 0.034 *
(0.008) (0.007) (0.020)
H2 last above -0.009 0.009 -0.031
(0.008) (0.008) (0.022)
constant 0.428 *** 0.622 *** -0.101
(0.054) (0.057) (0.100)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Curve risk. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Term spread -1 -0.690 *** -0.297 -0.917 ***
(0.163) (0.243) (0.251)
Ted spread -1 -0.505 * -7.614 -1.488 ***
(0.288) (5.353) (0.246)
Bond volatility -1 -0.016 -0.063 0.042
(0.029) (0.041) (0.031)
Rank -1 -0.007 -0.039 0.063 **
(0.027) (0.038) (0.028)
H2 rank 0.052 0.043 -0.012
(0.045) (0.066) (0.061)
H2 above bmk -0.098 ** -0.068 -0.055
(0.049) (0.072) (0.071)
Last year rank -0.032 * -0.016 -0.013
(0.018) (0.024) (0.034)
H2 last year -0.035 -0.028 0.007
(0.030) (0.039) (0.062)
H2 last above 0.046 0.020 0.024
(0.032) (0.041) (0.069)
constant 1.858 *** 1.868 *** 1.851 ***
(0.215) (0.308) (0.311)
obs 852 564 288




Fixed effects estimates of equation (1) as applied to Turnover. Robust standard errors in
in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 13: Curve risk - JPY portfolios
entire sample uniform approach currency specialization
2002-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
Table 14: Turnover - JPY portfolios
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2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
Negative 
performers
Ȗ1+Ȗ2 0.003 -0.012 0.023 0 0.045 -0.040 0 0.063
Positive 
performers
Ȗ1+Ȗ2+Ȗ3 0.003 -0.012 0.023 0 0.005 -0.040 0 0.063
Negative 
performers
į1+į2 -0.006 0 -0.003 0 -0.012 0.034 0 0
Positive 
performers
į1+į2+į3 -0.006 0 -0.003 0 -0.012 0.034 0 0




Table 15: Ranking effects in second semester - JPY portfolios
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2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
M1 Negative pfm -0.004
Positive pfm -0.062 -0.004
Negative pfm -0.011 -0.033
Positive pfm 0.069 -0.011 -0.033
M3 Negative pfm -0.009 0.019
Positive pfm -0.009 0.019
Negative pfm
Positive pfm
M7 Negative pfm 1.740
Positive pfm -0.014
Negative pfm 0.438 -0.657
Positive pfm 0.438 1.194
M8 Negative pfm 0 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.085 -0.209
Positive pfm 0 0.008 0.027 0.016 0.085 -0.209
Negative pfm -0.009 -0.027 -0.013 -0.096 -0.047 -0.141
Positive pfm -0.009 0.028 -0.030 -0.096 -0.047 -0.141
M9 Negative pfm
Positive pfm
Negative pfm -0.016 -0.439 -0.379





Selection by portfolio manager of estimates from Appendix Table 1, conditional on keeping the USD under currency specialization
and showing at least one significant coefficient across risk variables and regimes, at 10% level or better.
Rank
Last year rank
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2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009




M6 Negative pfm -0.020 -0.040 -0.351 0.202
Positive pfm -0.020 0.357 -0.351 0.202
Negative pfm 0.022 0.213
Positive pfm 0.022 -0.567 0.213
M9 Negative pfm -0.026 -0.823
Positive pfm -0.026 -0.823
Negative pfm -0.014 0.049 0.669
Positive pfm -0.014 0.049 0.669
M10 Negative pfm -0.066
Positive pfm 0.037
Negative pfm -0.035 -0.011
Positive pfm -0.035 -0.057 -0.011
M11 Negative pfm 0.033 0.057 -0.244
Positive pfm -0.028 0.033 -0.017 -0.244
Negative pfm -0.027 -0.053
Positive pfm -0.002 0.015
M12 Negative pfm 0.023 0.064 0.127 0.141
Positive pfm 0.023 0.005 -0.098 0.141
Negative pfm 0.030 -0.079 -0.251
Positive pfm 0.030 -0.002 -0.139
Selection by portfolio manager of estimates from Appendix Table 2, conditional on keeping the JPY under currency specialization
and showing at least one significant coefficient across risk variables and regimes, at 10% level or better.
Rank
Last year rank


















Rank M1 yes 0.026 ***
M2 -0.015 ** -0.287 **
M3 yes -0.009 * 0.019 **
M4 yes
M5 yes
M6 -0.007 ** -0.031 *** -0.058 *** -0.671 ***
M7 yes











M7 yes 1.740 **











M7 yes -1.754 *





Last year rank M1 yes -0.036 *** -0.033 *
M2 -0.024 ** -0.292 *
M3 yes 0.017 ***
M4 yes
M5 yes
M6 -0.006 ** -0.212 **
M7 yes 0.438 * 1.224 ***
M8 yes 0.006 *** 0.021 *** -0.141 *










M7 yes -1.882 *
M8 yes -0.015 *** -0.048 *** -0.013 *** -0.096 *** -0.047 ***
M9 yes
M10
M11 yes -0.013 *
M12






M7 yes 1.851 *






2 0.173 0.165 0.335 0.403 0.300 0.307 0.265 0.306
Fixed effects estimates of equation (2). The coefficients of the market variables and the constant are omitted for simplicity. The "curr spec" column
indicates whether the portfolio manager kept a USD portfolio under currency specialization. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
2006-2009
Curve risk Turnover
Appendix Table 1: Individual effects - USD portfolios
2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009













M6 yes -0.020 *** -0.351 *** 0.202 ***
M7
M8 -0.016 *** 0.066 *** 0.060 *** 0.459 ***
M9 yes -0.026 * -0.823 ***
M10 yes
M11 yes 0.033 *** 0.057 ** -0.244 **
M12 yes -0.082 *** 0.141 **





M6 yes -0.040 *
M7 0.036 ***
M8 0.031 *** 0.027 *** 0.087 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes -0.066 *
M11 yes
M12 yes 0.023 * 0.064 *** 0.209 ***





M6 yes 0.396 ***
M7
M8 -0.030 ** -0.087 *** -0.234 *** -0.496 **
M9 yes
M10 yes 0.103 ***
M11 yes -0.028 * -0.074 *
M12 yes -0.060 ** -0.225 ***
Last year rank M1 -0.017 ** -0.043 **
M2 yes -0.085 **
M3
M4 0.028 * -0.172 **
M5 -0.016 *** -0.225 **
M6 yes 0.022 *** 0.213 *
M7 0.012 ***
M8 0.011 *** -0.021 **
M9 yes -0.014 * 0.049 *** 0.669 ***
M10 yes -0.035 *** -0.111 ***
M11 yes -0.053 ***
M12 yes -0.013 ** -0.135 ***







M8 -0.020 *** -0.035 *** -0.056 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes
M11 yes -0.027 *
M12 yes -0.017 ** -0.079 *** -0.117 ***





M6 yes -0.567 ***
M7 0.013 *
M8 0.032 *** 0.070 ***
M9 yes
M10 yes -0.057 ***
M11 yes 0.025 * 0.068 *
M12 yes 0.077 *** 0.112 ***
R
2
0.288 0.401 0.519 0.127 0.530 0.3755 0.360 0.282
Fixed effects estimates of equation (2). The coefficients of the market variables and the constant are omitted for simplicity. The "curr spec" column
indicates whether the portfolio manager kept a JPY portfolio under currency specialization. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
2006-2009
Curve risk Turnover
Appendix Table 2: Individual effects - JPY portfolios
2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009
Duration risk Spread risk
2002-2005
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